I’m a bit of a contrarian today…

—Ivan Maisel makes the following note about the Miami passing game:

For evidence of new Miami offensive coordinator Mark Whipple’s effect on the Hurricanes, check out the passing game on first down: Jacory Harris is 21-of-28 for 394 yards and three touchdowns. The first-down rushing stats: 33 carries for 114 yards and two touchdowns. First-down passes are customary in the NFL, where Whipple spent the past five seasons. So far, that pro strategy is working well in the college game.

I think it’s a stretch to equate Miami’s first down passing with a ‘pro strategy’.  The main reason:  Look at the yards per attempt, which is an amazing 14 yards.  Pro teams never throw the ball downfield with that kind of effectiveness on any down. 

—More on Miami and its revival from Austin Murphy.

While they may yet get there under third-year coach Randy Shannon, these ‘Canes are nowhere near as good as the juggernaut that was Miami’s 2002 squad, which took a 34-game winning streak into the BCS title game against Ohio State.

Hmmm.  I agree that this year’s Miami team is nowhere near as talented as that 2002 Miami squad.  But it has a chance–a chance mind you–to be as good or better.  I know it’s early in the year, but why do I think so?

Simple.  I think there’s a chance that Miami may be in ‘the sweet spot.’

That’s what I call the period of time in a program’s development where success is clearly underway but the rot and pressure of expectations, as well as coaching hubris, have not yet set in.  Miami has a nice mix of pre-Shannon players who are motivated after growing tired of losing and also younger, more talented players who feel they are the revivers of the program.  As the old players are shuffled out and the new players mature, the energy around the program will maintain its freshness and the winning will sustain it. 

Because of the lack of depth, young players will get early reps and have a better shot at developing into great players sooner.  Better coaching and systems on both sides of the ball will nurture these players into confident contributors.

However, once new recruiting classes come into this improved situation and combine with the group of players who only know this new success, it will become more difficult to maintain the same sense of urgency.  The roster will fill with talent, with the resulting competition breeding quality in some areas, but also deferring development in others.  Meanwhile, opposing teams will scheme to counter any advantage that was gained during the program’s revival. 

Getting to the mountain top is a thrilling ride, but once you get there, it’s hard to remember why you wanted it so bad.  That’s what happened to the Miami teams post 2002 and to the USC teams post 2005.  Now, it may well be that Miami doesn’t quite get back to that level of success just yet, but the window of opportunity appears to exist to enable it to get back among the nation’s elite, competing for national titles again.

—Couple items of note from Stew Mandel’s mailbag:

After one reader wrote about USC’s offensive fall since Norm Chow’s departure, Mandel writes:

But couldn’t one also make the following assertion: that “USC’s offense began a slow decline” when one of the greatest collections of skill players ever assembled on one team — Matt Leinart, Reggie Bush, LenDale White, Steve Smith and Dwayne Jarrett — left? Ever since that 2003-05 run, when the Trojans went 37-2, won two national titles and played for a third, everyone has just assumed USC would keep reloading without skipping a beat. Has anyone ever stopped to consider that the aforementioned group — which, incidentally, posted its most productive season the year after Chow’s departure — has been pretty darn tough to replicate?

One could make this assertion.  But I think everyone forgets that Leinart, Bush, White and Jarrett were themselves replacements for guys like Carson Palmer, Sultan McCullough, Justin Fargas and Mike Williams who were the foundation of what was already a great offense in 2002 (especially the last seven games when it averaged 43 points during Palmer’s Heisman run).  These guys arrived starting in 2003 and the USC offense didn’t miss a beat.  In other words, Chow had already brought the USC offense back and when these guys landed on the roster, he plugged them in and even greater success followed (that highly successful 2005 group was comprised entirely of players tutored and developed by Chow, by the way).  I think the safe assumption among many Trojan fans was that USC would continue to plug and play as it had in the past. 

The problem is that USC’s offense grew progressively more complex and pro-like in the post-Chow years.  The Trojan roster loaded up with five-straight No. 1 recruiting classes, which created a logjam and meant that young players didn’t contribute as much right away as they had before.  Plus, the offense wasn’t as easy to grasp as it was under Chow.  USC’s offensive philosophy also became incoherent as it tried to satisfy all the talent at hand.  This resulted in predictable personnel packages that made it easier for defenses to counter (especially in the Pac-10, where teams were familiar with the scheme and personnel).  And of course the playcalling–no doubt influenced heavily by Carroll’s NFL philosophy–left a lot to be desired.

If you don’t think that offensive philosophy and playcalling are important, that you just need great players, just look at what Gus Malzahn is doing at Auburn with the same players it had the previous season.  Suddenly, these guys can play.  Heck, look at what Chow did with Carson Palmer, who was a total reclamation project.  The Jimmy’s and Joe’s matter, for sure.  But you have to use them right, which means your X’s and O’s better be in order.  And last I checked, great offenses existed both before and after the arrival of Leinart and Bush.   Mark Sanchez and Joe McKnight weren’t those guys, but they didn’t have to be better than Leinart and Bush to be great, just better than the guys on the opposing defenses they went up against.  Talent-wise, they were/are, but USC’s offense certainly didn’t maximize their abilities.

—I’m not sure I agree with the premise of Andy Staples’ point that the Pac-10 has to have an undefeated team to make the BCS title game. 

Unfortunately for the Pac-10, which is better than a lot of my fellow east-coasters think, that means the Pac-10 champ will have to go undefeated to make the game.  So Cal, which has looked excellent to this point, will have to beat USC on Oct. 3 to have a chance. Obviously, if Texas goes undefeated, the matchup is set. But if the Big 12 turns into a stew of one- and two-loss conference title contenders, it opens the door for the Pac-10 champ. Unfortunately, an 11-1 record just won’t cut it for Cal or for USC. Cal doesn’t have the cachet to make it at 11-1.

I agree with the point that a one-loss or undefeated SEC team has one spot in the title game nailed down.  But assuming no other team goes undefeated, then I’m not sure why a once-defeated USC or Cal wouldn’t have the best case to make to go to that other slot (we are talking hypothetically here) over a one-loss team from the Big 12 or Big Ten (assuming the ACC and Big East champs aren’t in the picture).

By all measures, the Pac-10 is no worse than the second-best conference this season.  In some, it is currently the best.  So why the assumption that the Pac-10 team must get through unscathed, especially given the Big 12 and Big Ten’s last few BCS title game debacles?  I think the resurgent Pac-10 would get the second slot in that scenario (though maybe I am being naive).

So, if that ends up being the case, then the folks at the Pac-10 offices could also root for a tight USC win against Cal and then for both teams to run the table.  Of course, if Cal runs the table anyway, then it’s a moot point, but I still say the other position is valid in the right scenario.